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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Maintaining  sustained  attention  over  time  is  an  effortful  process  limited  by ﬁnite  cognitive  resources.
Recent  theories  describe  the role  of  motivation  in  the  allocation  of such  resources  as  a decision  process:
the  costs  of effortful  performance  are  weighed  against  its gains.  We  examined  this  hypothesis  by combin-
ing  methods  from  attention  research  and  decision  neuroscience.  Participants  ﬁrst performed  a  sustained
attention  task  at different  levels  of reward.  They  then  performed  a reward-discounting  task,  measuringeywords:
ustained attention
upillometry
eward motivation
ffort-discounting
ecision making
the  subjective  costs  of performance.  Results  demonstrated  that  higher  rewards  led to  improved  perfor-
mance (Exp  1–3),  and  enhanced  attentional  effort  (i.e.  pupil  diameter;  Exp 2 &  3). Moreover,  discounting
curves  constructed  from  the  choice  task indicated  that  subjects  devalued  rewards  that came  at the  cost  of
staying vigilant  for  a longer  duration  (Exp  1 & 2).  Motivation  can  thus  boost  sustained  attention  through
increased  effort,  while  sustained  performance  is  regarded  as  a cost  against  which  rewards  are  discounted.
©  2016  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under the  CC  BY-NC-ND. Introduction
The capacity to sustain attention while performing a
onotonous task has been studied for many decades (Mackworth,
956). Prevailing theories describe deteriorating performance as
 function of task demand, where demand can either be too high,
raining the necessary cognitive resources (resource theory: Grier
t al., 2003; Warm,  Parasuraman, & Matthews, 2008), or too low to
aintain arousal (underload theory: Manly, Robertson, Galloway,
 Hawkins, 1999; Robertson, Manly, Andrade, Baddeley, & Yiend,
997). Although these approaches successfully explain the effects
f external task factors, they may  present an overly mechanistic
iew of sustained attention that is not governed by high-level
ecision making, and so fail to take into account psychological
rives such as motivation.
Resource theories propose that sustaining high performance
elies on a limited pool of cognitive resources that shrinks
ith time-on-task (Warm et al., 2008). Failures in attention are
ttributed to diminishing resources when one has to maintain
lertness over a long duration. Underload models on the other
and posit that the monotonous nature of sustained attention tasks
akes performance prone to intrusion by task-unrelated thoughts
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/).license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
(Manly et al., 1999; Robertson et al., 1997). Failure to detect task-
critical signals results from the occurrence of such off-task epochs.
Although there is evidence for both accounts, neither theory
completely explains observed behavior. The resource depletion
hypothesis assumes that participants are fully committed and are
always giving their maximal effort (Nicholls, Loveless, Thomas,
Loetscher, & Churches, 2015), while the underload hypothesis
cannot explain why participants subjectively ﬁnd extended task
performance increasingly effortful (Warm et al., 2008).
More recent theories propose that performance is subject to
the dynamic allocation of processing resources to task-related and
alternative cognitive processes (effort allocation theory: Kurzban,
Duckworth, Kable, & Myers, 2013; Thomson, Besner, & Smilek,
2015). How resources are assigned to task performance depends
on a cost-beneﬁt analysis where the costs of task performance
are weighed against the expected value of its outcomes (Kurzban
et al., 2013). Better performance would be expected when a
task carries higher value (e.g. through providing rewards: Braver
et al., 2014), while behavioral decline would be expected if per-
formance becomes more costly (e.g. due to fatigue: Boksem &
Tops, 2008). A few studies have examined the effects of motiva-
tion and reward on sustained attention performance (Bergum &
Lehr, 1964; Bonnefond, Doignon-Camus, Hoeft, & Dufour, 2011;
Esterman, Reagan, Liu, Turner, & DeGutis, 2014; Horne & Pettitt,
1985), but it is still unclear if performance levels are determined
via cost-beneﬁt analysis.
under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.
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The current study was inspired by decision neuroscience stud-
es on the cost of expending effort on task performance (Botvinick,
uffstetler, & Mcguire, 2009; Kurniawan et al., 2010; Prevost,
essiglione, Metereau, Clery-Melin, & Dreher, 2010; Treadway,
uckholtz, Schwartzman, Lambert, & Zald, 2009) and how such
xpenditure is avoided when one is presented with a choice (Kool,
cguire, Rosen, & Botvinick, 2010; McGuire & Botvinick, 2010). The
ubjective costs of effort can be quantiﬁed by evaluating effort dis-
ounting − a tendency to devalue rewards when effort is required
o obtain them (Massar, Libedinsky, Weiyan, Huettel, & Chee, 2015;
revost et al., 2010; Westbrook, Kester, & Braver, 2013). When
hoosing between a large reward, obtained in exchange for the
eployment of some effort or a smaller reward obtained at no cost
f effort, we tend to prefer the latter. The reward we  are willing to
ccept (i.e. how much the reward value is discounted) reﬂects the
erceived cost of effort.
Here, we evaluated how this type of cost-beneﬁt decision affects
ur capacity to sustain attention. First, we examined whether
igher reward would improve performance and increase effort
xertion in accordance with the effort allocation framework. Sec-
nd, we determined whether performance was perceived as a cost
y having participants consider exchanging task performance for
onetary reward. We found support for these predictions in three
xperiments. When rewards were available, we observed improved
erformance and pupillometric evidence for increased attentional
ffort exertion. At the same time, participants discounted rewards
hen a longer duration of task performance was required.
. Experiment 1
.1. Methods
.1.1. Participants & procedure
Twenty-ﬁve subjects (9 females, mean age = 22.72 years,
D = 2.7) were recruited. Previous research on reward effects in
ustained attention indicated large effect sizes ranging between
ohen’s d of 0.84–1.47 in a between-subjects design (Esterman
ig. 1. Experiment 1: Schematics of a trial in (A) the Motivated Vigilance Task and (B) 
onditions with (left) lapses of attention and (right) response speed. (D) Discounting curvchology 120 (2016) 21–27
et al., 2014). From power analysis, it follows that a sample size of
9–24 subjects per group would be sufﬁcient to detect such effects.
We decided on a sample size of 25 in a within-subjects design
with data collection continuing until the target sample size was
reached. Due to technical error one participant was removed from
the sample at the analysis stage. Participants performed a sustained
attention task under three different reward conditions in which
they could earn 0, 1 or 10¢ for fast responses. It was expected that
higher incentives would lead to better performance, indicative of
higher effort investment.
Subsequently, the idea that effort investment would result from
a cost-beneﬁt analysis was  directly examined using a discounting
task. The discounting task is a widely used method in economic
research that allows estimating the subjective value that an indi-
vidual assigns to a monetary reward, taking into account the
(non-monetary) costs that are involved in acquiring the reward.
We expected that if participants would consider sustained atten-
tion performance as costly, they would discount the value of a given
reward, if it would be contingent upon performance of a longer
duration of the PVT task. The discounting task consisted of a mon-
etary choice task, followed a choice implementation (see below).
Participants were reimbursed based on their performance in the
reward runs of the sustained attention task, and their selected
reward in the choice task. The procedure was  approved by the
National University of Singapore Institutional Review Board and
participants signed informed consent prior to participation.
2.1.2. Motivated vigilance task
The Motivated Vigilance Task is an adaptation of the Psychomo-
tor Vigilance Test (PVT; Dinges & Powell, 1985), which is a 10-min
sustained attention task where participants make a button press
as quickly as possible upon the appearance of a running millisec-
ond counter (Fig. 1A). These stimuli were separated by uniformly
distributed inter-trial intervals that ranged from 2 to 10 s. Partici-
pants performed one baseline run without reward, followed by two
runs in which participants were rewarded if their responses were
faster or equal to the median RT achieved in the baseline run. Par-
the Choice Task. (C) Vigilance performance under baseline, low and high reward
e in the choice task. (Error bars denote ± 1SEM; +p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01).
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icipants received 1¢ per fast response in the low reward run and
0¢ per fast response in the high reward run. The order of the low
nd high reward runs was counterbalanced across-subjects. Atten-
ional performance was quantiﬁed as the number of attentional
apses (responses with RT > 500 ms)  and as mean response speed
1/RT) per run. These metrics are considered the most sensitive
erformance indicators for this task (Basner & Dinges, 2011).
.1.3. Discounting task
In the discounting procedure, ﬁrst the subjective cost of perfor-
ance was determined through a choice task (Weber & Huettel,
008; see Fig. 1B). Participants were presented with pairs of mon-
tary offers (ranging from $1 to $12). Each choice pair consisted of
ne low reward option (variable magnitude), that was  available in
eturn for a short duration PVT (1 min), and an option that offered a
igher reward ($12) for a longer duration PVT (5, 10, 20 or 30 min).
fter each choice, the monetary reward for low reward option was
djusted following a staircase titration method (i.e. increased if the
ong duration option was chosen and decreased if the short duration
as chosen). This procedure was iterated for six trials per duration,
fter which the indifference point was determined as the average of
he largest amount for which the subject chose the short duration
ption and the smallest amount for which the subject chose the
ong duration option. This procedure typically yields stronger dis-
ounting of reward values with higher levels of effort (Libedinsky
t al., 2013; Massar et al., 2015; Westbrook et al., 2013).
.1.4. Choice implementation
To establish incentive compatibility (i.e. incentivizing subjects
o express their true preference in the choice task), one choice trial
as randomly selected for implementation. The participant would
eceive the monetary amount that he/she had chosen on that trial,
nd was required to perform the PVT for the associated duration of
ime. In order to ensure subjects based their choices on the costs
f task performance and not on whether they would receive their
eward sooner or later (i.e. delay discounting), they were instructed
hat they would need to stay in the lab for a ﬁxed duration of 30 min.
uring this period, they would perform the PVT for the chosen
uration, and spend the remaining time resting. Hence, the total
uration after the discounting task was 30 min  for all participants.
.2. Results
.2.1. Motivated vigilance task
In line with the effort regulation hypothesis, there was  a sig-
iﬁcant decrease in the number of lapses with increasing reward
F(2,46) = 4.32, p = 0.019, p2 = 0.158), Response speed increased
ith increasing reward (F(2,46) = 12.57, p < 0.001, p2 = 0.353).
peed increased from baseline to low reward runs (F(1,23) = 4.72,
 = 0.040, p2 = 0.170), and additionally from low to high reward
uns (F(1,23) = 12.35, p = 0.002, p2 = 0.342; Fig. 1C).
The change in performance with progressing time-on-task was
uantiﬁed by ﬁtting linear regression models to each run of the
igilance task, using response speed as the dependent measure.
egative slopes indicate that response speed declined over time
n all conditions (Baseline mean slope = −0.18, SD = 0.17; t-test
gainst 0: t(23) = 4.96, p < 0.001, 95% CI = [−0.254, −0.104]; low
eward mean slope = −0.15, SD = 0.11, t(23) = 6.41, p < 0.001, 95%
I = [−0.199, −0.102]; high reward mean slope = −0.14, SD = 0.16,
(23) = 4.13, p < 0.001, 95% CI = [−0.205, −0.068]), with no difference
etween conditions (F(2,46) = 0.66, p = 0.52, p2 = 0.028)..2.2. Discounting task
Participants discounted the value of rewards according to dura-
ion of task performance (F(4, 92) = 82.94, p < 0.001, p2 = 0.783).
ubjective values monotonically decreased with increasing taskchology 120 (2016) 21–27 23
duration indicating that prolonged performance of the PVT was
considered a cost against which rewards were discounted (Fig. 1D).
2.3. Discussion
Experiment 1 showed that reward value inﬂuences both task
performance and the willingness to engage in task performance for
a speciﬁed duration. In line with the Effort Allocation theory, these
ﬁndings show that participants are able to improve performance if
the task carries sufﬁcient value, and conversely, that reward value
is discounted if more costly (longer duration) task performance is
required.
3. Experiment 2
A further prediction from the effort allocation account is that
higher task value would result in the allocation of more pro-
cessing resources to task performance. This was tested using
pupillometry. Pupil diameter is known to reﬂect arousal and atten-
tional effort, and it scales with task difﬁculty (Bradshaw, 1967;
Kahneman & Beatty, 1966), potentially through noradrenergic
activity (Gilzenrat, Nieuwenhuis, & Jepma, 2010; Varazzani, San-
Galli, Gilardeau, & Bouret, 2015) Moreover, recent studies have
indicated that pupil diameter decreases with time-on- task and
that this reduction is related to task disengagement over time
(Hopstaken, van der Linden, Bakker, & Kompier, 2014). We  there-
fore expected performance improvement in the PVT associated
with increased reward to be accompanied by pupil dilatation. We
additionally predicted that pupil size would decrease with time-
on-task.
3.1. Methods
3.1.1. Participants & procedure
A new sample of 25 participants was recruited (10 females,
mean age = 22.72 SD = 3.09). Participants performed the same
experimental procedure as in Experiment 1, but now pupil diam-
eter was  monitored through eye-tracker during PVT performance.
Data from one participant was excluded from analysis due to tech-
nical error.
3.1.2. Pupillometry
Pupil diameter was  monitored using a Tobii X60 eye-
tracker (Tobii AB, Danderyd, Sweden). Data were sampled
at 60 Hz and corrected ofﬂine for blinks and artifacts by lin-
ear interpolation. Pupil diameter was  determined in the 1-s
window preceding stimulus onset, and individual z-scores
([diametertrial n − meandiameter]/stdevdiameter) were calculated
across all PVT runs. Average score was calculated per PVT run for
each subject. Two  participants did not have complete pupillometry
data and were excluded from this analysis.
3.2. Results
3.2.1. Behavior
As in Experiment 1, lapses decreased with increasing reward
(F(2,46) = 5.93, p = 0.005, p2 = 0.205; baseline = low reward:
F(1,23) = 0.23, p = 0.634, p2 = 0.010; low reward > high reward:
F(1,23) = 7.40, p = 0.012, p2 = 0.244). Response speed increased
as a function of reward (F(2,46) = 21.28, p < 0.001, p2 = 0.481;
baseline < low reward: F(1,23) = 4.99, p = 0.036, p2 = 0.178; low
reward < high reward: F(1,23) = 24.39 p < 0.001, p2 = 0.515,
Fig. 2A). Furthermore, participants signiﬁcantly discounted the
value of rewards according to the proposed task duration in the
choice task (F(4,92) = 35.15, p < 0.001, p2 = 0.604, Fig. 2B).
24 S.A.A. Massar et al. / Biological Psychology 120 (2016) 21–27
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Fig. 2. Experiment 2: (A) Vigilance performance under baseline, low and high rew
urve  in the choice task (Error bars denote ± 1SEM; +p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01). (C)
onditions (green). (D) Pre-stimulus pupil size as a function of time-on-task (Shade
.2.2. Pupillometry
Pupil diameter increased as a function of reward (F(2,42) = 11.15,
 < 0.001, p2 = 0.347; baseline < low reward: F(1,21) = 8.85,
 = 0.007, p2 = 0.296; marginal increase from low reward to high
eward: F(1,21) = 3.37, p = 0.080, p2 = 0.138, Fig. 2C). This increase
n pupil diameter was interpreted as indicating that greater
hysiological effort was exerted during reward runs.
.2.3. Time-on-task analysis
Similar to Experiment 1 time-on-task effects were calculated
y ﬁtting linear regressions for each PVT run with response speed
nd pupil size as dependent variables and time-on-task as a
egressor. For response speed negative slopes were found in all
onditions (Baseline mean slope = −0.17, SD = 0.16 t-test against 0:
(23) = 5.13, p < 0.001, 95% CI = [−0.237, −0.100]; low reward mean
lope = −0.088, SD = 0.15, t(23) = 2.85, p = 0.009, 95% CI = [−0.152,
0.024]; High reward mean slope = −0.082, SD = 0.15, t(23) = 2.78,
 = 0.011, 95% CI = [−0.143, −0.021]), with marginal difference
etween reward conditions (F(2,46) = 3.20, p = 0.05, p2 = 0.122).
Follow-up paired samples t-tests showed a marginally more
egative slope in baseline compared to low reward t(23) = 2.03,
 = 0.054, 95%CI = [−0.163, 0.002]; no difference in slope between
ow reward and high reward: t(23) = 0.17, p = 0.87, 95%CI = [−0.077,
.066], signiﬁcantly more negative slope in baseline compared to
igh reward t(23) = 2.16, p = 0.04, 95%CI = [−0.170, −0.004].
Similarly, for pupil diameter negative slopes were found for
ll runs (baseline: mean slope = −0.38, SD = 0.26), one-sample t-
est against 0: t(21) = 6.94, p < 0.001, 95% CI = [−0.491, −0.264]; low
eward mean slope = −0.31, SD = 0.30, t(21) = 4.79, p < 0.001, 95%
I = [−0.441, −0.174 high reward: mean slope = −0.38, SD = 0.38,
(21) = 4.68, p < 0.001, 95% CI = [−0.544, −0.209], with no difference
etween reward conditions (F(2,42) = 0.74, p = 0.485, p2 = 0.034,
ig. 2D).nditions with (left) lapses of attention and (right) response speed. (B) Discounting
lus locked pupil size in the baseline (light grey), low reward (red), and high reward
r-bars denote ±1 within-subjects SEM).
3.3. Discussion
The behavioral results of Experiment 2 clearly replicate the
ﬁndings of Experiment 1: performance improved with increasing
reward, and subjective reward value was  discounted with increas-
ing task duration. Pupillometric data additionally demonstrated
that overall pupil size was larger throughout rewarded task runs,
indicative of higher attentional effort.
4. Experiment 3
To verify that the increased pupil diameter, as was found in the
reward runs in Experiment 2, was  indicative of greater attentional
effort rather than increased arousal associated with the availabil-
ity of higher rewards, we  performed a control experiment where a
random reward condition was  included. In this condition, rewards
equal to the high reward condition were available, but were pro-
vided randomly instead of being related to reaction time.
4.1. Methods
Twenty-six participants (15 females, mean age = 23.04,
SD = 3.25) performed three runs of the MVT  task. As in Exper-
iments 1 and 2 the ﬁrst run was a baseline run, in which no
rewards were provided. The second and third runs were the high
reward and random reward runs (in counter balanced order). In the
high reward run, participants received 10¢ rewards for every fast
response. In the random reward run, they were instructed that they
would receive 10¢ rewards at random times, not dependent on
performance. In both runs the delivery of a reward was  indicated
by the target stimulus turning green after a response was made.
During all runs, pupil diameter was continuously monitored. Due
to technical error, two  participants were excluded from analysis.
S.A.A. Massar et al. / Biological Psychology 120 (2016) 21–27 25
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rig. 3. Experiment 3: (A) Vigilance performance as determined by response speed 
p  < 0.05, **p < 0.01). (B) Stimulus locked pupil size in the baseline (light grey), rand
unction  of time-on-task (Shaded error-bars denote ±1 within-subjects SEM).
.2. Results
.2.1. Behavior
Signiﬁcant differences in performance were found between
VT  runs (run main effect; lapses: F(2,46) = 7.85, p = 0.001,
p
2 = 0.254; response speed: F(2.46) = 19.11, p < 0.001, p2 = 0.45).
 planned contrast showed that the number of lapses did not dif-
er between baseline and high reward run: F(1,23) = 2.29, p = 0.144,
p
2 = 0.090; but response speed improved from the baseline to high
eward run: F(1,23) = 7.24, p = 0.01, p2 = 0.24. In contrast, poorer
erformance was found in the random reward run compared
o baseline (lapses: F(1,23) = 9.22, p = 0.006, p2 = 0.286; response
peed: F(1,23) = 16.17, p = 0.001, p2 = 0.41, Fig. 3A).
.2.2. Pupillometry
Pre-stimulus pupil diameter showed a main effect of run
F(2.46) = 5.92, p = 0.005, p2 = 0.21). This effect was  driven by an
ncrease in pupil diameter in the high reward run compared to
aseline (F(1,23) = 7.14, p = 0.01, p2 = 0.24). Crucially no increase in
upil diameter was found when rewards were delivered at random
s compared to the baseline (F(1,23) = 0.077, p = 0.78, p2 = 0.003,
ig. 3B).
.2.3. Time-on-task analysis
As in Experiments 1 and 2, response speed decreased with time-
n-task in all conditions (Baseline mean slope = −0.14, SD = 0.16, t-
est against 0: t(23) = 4.37, p < 0.001, 95% CI = [−0.213, −0.076]; ran-
om reward mean slope = −0.17, SD = 0.19, t(23) = 4.42, p < 0.001,
5% CI = [−0.249, −0.090]; high reward mean slope = −0.15,
D = 0.13, t(23) = 5.80, p < 0.001, 95% CI = [−0.200, −0.095]), with no
ifference between conditions (F(2,46) = 0.22, p = 0.81, p2 = 0.009).
For pre-stimulus pupil diameter, there was a signiﬁcant dif-erence in time on task slope between conditions (F(2,46) = 4.80,
 = 0.013, p2 = 0.17, Fig. 3C). A signiﬁcantly stronger decrease in
upil diameter was found in the random reward condition (mean
andom slope = −0.51, SD = 0.23) compared to the baseline condi- baseline, random and high reward conditions (Error bars denote ± 1SEM; +p < 0.1,
ward (yellow), and high reward conditions (green). (C) Pre-stimulus pupil size as a
tion (Mean baseline slope = −0.30, SD = 0.36; t(23) = 3.14, p = 0.005,
95% CI = [0.071, 0.34]). The high reward condition (mean high
slope = −0.40, SD = 0.17) did not differ from baseline (t(23) = 1.30,
p = 0.21, 95% CI = [−0.060, 0.265]).
4.3. Discussion
Results of Experiment 3 replicated those obtained in Experiment
2, demonstrating that rewards improve performance and increase
attentional effort. Crucially, an increase in pupil diameter was only
present when rewards were contingent on good performance (high
reward condition) but not when high reward was  provided at ran-
dom (random reward condition).
4.4. Cross-experiments correlational analysis
We examined whether there was any relation between perfor-
mance in the PVT task and the level of discounting in the choice
task. We  extracted the area under the discounting curve (AUC;
Myerson, Green, & Warusawitharana, 2001) as an individual mea-
sure of discounting for all participants from Experiment 1 and 2,
and correlated this with the difference in response speed between
the high reward PVT run and the baseline run. A signiﬁcant posi-
tive correlation was  found (r(46) = 0.31, p = 0.032, Fig. 4), indicating
that participants who showed the strongest improvement in per-
formance in the PVT discounted the least in the choice task. A
similar correlation between discounting AUC and reward beneﬁt
in pre-stimulus pupil diameter (Experiment 2: high-baseline) was
not signiﬁcant (r(20) = 0.005, p = 0.98).
4.5. False start response analysisTo examine whether the increase in response speed in the
rewarded PVT runs was  accompanied by more liberal response
threshold (i.e. speed-accuracy trade-off) we  analyzed the number
26 S.A.A. Massar et al. / Biological Psy
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ask and performance beneﬁt in the PVT.
f responses that occurred before the onset of the target stimulus
false starts; Fig. 5).
In Experiment 1 no signiﬁcant difference in the number of
alse starts was found between reward conditions (F(2,46) = 2.02,
 = 0.144), although numerically fewer false starts were found in
ewarded runs (mean baseline = 2.33, SD = 3.19; low reward = 1.6,
D = 2.10; high reward = 1.2, SD = 1.41).
In Experiment 2 false starts occurred signiﬁcantly less in
he rewarded runs (mean low reward = 0.63, SD = 0.71, high
eward = 0.54, SD = 0.98) compared to baseline (mean = 1.42,
D = 1.25; F(2,46) = 6.64, p = 0.003, p2 = 0.224).
In Experiment 3 no signiﬁcant difference were found in the
umber of false starts (F(2,46) = 1.33, p = 0.28; mean baseline = 1.46,
D = 1.35; random reward = 2.17, SD = 2.55; high reward = 1.58,
D = 1.59).
This pattern of data demonstrates that the increase in response
peed in the rewarded runs did not come at the expense of a more
mpulsive response strategy. Rather, participants showed an overall
mprovement of performance when reward was at stake (Manohar
t al., 2015).
. General discussion
We  found that sustained attention performance improved in
nticipation of greater reward. This was accompanied by increased
upil size in rewarded task runs, indicative of increased alloca-
ion of attentional resources to task performance (Kahneman &
eatty, 1966). In the choice task, participants discounted monetary
ewards that were contingent on longer-duration task perfor-
ance, indicating that prolonged task performance is considered
Fig. 5. False start responses in the Motivated Vigilance Tchology 120 (2016) 21–27
a cost against which rewards are devalued (Botvinick et al., 2009;
Prevost et al., 2010).
These results follow the predictions of the Effort Alloca-
tion theory and suggest that sustained attention performance is
substantially inﬂuenced by the motivational value of the task.
Extending earlier studies that reported improved sustained atten-
tion performance with reward (Bergum & Lehr, 1964; Esterman
et al., 2014; Horne & Pettitt, 1985) we demonstrated that improve-
ment was  associated with increased attentional effort. This increase
in effort allocation with reward is not predicted by Resource The-
ories which assume that maximal attentional effort is constantly
applied (Grier et al., 2003).
In addition to the overall improvement in performance and
increase in pupil size in the rewarded runs of the Motivated Vigi-
lance Task, marked decline in performance with time-on-task was
evident under all conditions. Here, our results do not unequiv-
ocally align to a single theory. The performance decline could
reﬂect depletion of resources with time-on-task, even when more
resources are initially allocated to the task (Esterman et al., 2014).
Alternatively, performance decrement could reﬂect voluntarily
withdrawal of attentional resources as performance became more
effortful with time. The latter interpretation would be in line with
the effort allocation account (Kurzban et al., 2013; Thomson et al.,
2015). In contrast to a previous study, we found that subjects could
uphold their performance better over time-on-task in rewarded
runs compared to baseline (Esterman et al., 2014). However, this
was only the case in one out of three experiments (Exp2). Fur-
ther, this difference in reward conditions was not mirrored in
pre-stimulus pupil diameter, where the time-on-task decrement
was consistently present in all runs. We  therefore refrain from any
strong conclusions with respect to the subjects’ ability to counter
the time-on-task effect as a function of reward motivation.
One of the central tenets of Effort Allocation models is that
the choice to deploy resources in task performance is based on a
cost-beneﬁt analysis in which effort is weighted against expected
reward (Kurzban et al., 2013). This idea was more explicitly
tested in the discounting task where participants made prospec-
tive decisions about how much experimental time to spend on
task performance relative to task-unrelated activities. Participants
discounted the value of available rewards when the proposed dura-
tion of the task increased, suggesting that they found longer tasks
increasingly costly. This interpretation concurs with observations
that subjective workload increases with longer task duration (Grier
et al., 2003; Warm et al., 2008). The current data concur with recent
studies on effort-based decision-making, which observe that the
level of cognitive demand affects preference and valuation in a
variety of tasks (Kool et al., 2010; Massar et al., 2015; McGuire &
Botvinick, 2010; Westbrook et al., 2013). More speciﬁcally, our data
show that the subjective valuation of available rewards depends on
the relative division of time between effortful performance and rest
(Kool & Botvinick, 2014).
A further prediction of Effort Allocation theory would be that
when more resources are allocated to task performance, fewer
ask in Experiment 1–3. Error bars denote ± 1SEM.
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Westbrook, A., Kester, D., & Braver, T. S. (2013). What is the subjective cost ofS.A.A. Massar et al. / Biologi
esources should be available for task-unrelated cognition. This
ypothesis was not directly tested in the current study, but other
tudies that have measured the occurrence of task-unrelated
houghts (TUT) indeed indicate that TUTs happen less frequently
hen participants are more motivated to perform, either intrin-
ically or through monetary incentives (Mrazek et al., 2012; Seli,
heyne, Xu, Purdon, & Smilek, 2015).
In conclusion, the current study clearly establishes that effort
llocation in sustained attention performance is affected by the
otivational value of the task, and that the subjective value of
eward is discounted by the effort required to receive the reward.
hese ﬁndings cannot easily be explained by traditional Resource
nd Underload theories without additionally assuming some level
f volitional control over resource allocation. By including this
ontrol as a factor in sustained attention models, we  are moving
way from explanations viewing the brain as a “capacity limited
achine”. Rather, this allows us to accommodate ﬁndings from a
ariety of different subﬁelds (e.g. motivation, emotion and deci-
ion neuroscience), opening the door to a richer and more accurate
odel of sustained attention performance.
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